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ANALYTICAL ESSAY
Beyond Statist Paradigms: Sociospatial
Positionality and Diaspora Mobilization in
International Relations
MARIA KOINOVA
University of Warwick
This article presents a new positional perspective for the analysis of dia-
spora mobilization in international relations (IR), seeking to shift
debates beyond realist, liberalist, and constructivist thinking, and speak-
ing to a cluster of sociopositional theories in IR. It provides a conceptual
discussion and empirical illustrations of diaspora positionality—the
power diaspora activists derive from their sociospatial positions in partic-
ular contexts—and its utility to account for different mobilization
trajectories. Positionality as a sociospatial concept offers opportunities to
analyze diaspora politics beyond statist paradigms, dominated by analyses
of triadic relationships between diasporas, host states (immigration
states), and home states (sending states). Diasporas have links to many
contexts beyond host states and original home states. Such linkages
structure their relationships globally. If diaspora entrepreneurs perceive
themselves as deriving strong powers to achieve homeland-oriented goals
from a particular sociospatial context, they are more likely to pursue
claims through institutional politics and moderate means. If they per-
ceive themselves as deriving weak powers from a context, they are more
likely to engage with activist networks and pursue claims in transgressive
ways. The conceptual discussion engages aspects of diaspora positionality
in juxtaposition with other spatial concepts such as geographical proxim-
ity/distance and position in a social network. The empirical discussion
brings patterns of mobilization trajectories from the Armenian diaspora
mobilization for genocide recognition and the Palestinian diaspora
mobilization for statehood, informed by a rich multisited fieldwork.
Keywords: diaspora, international relations, sociospatial
positionality
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Introduction
Transnational diaspora mobilization has become important in international rela-
tions (IR). A growing number of scholars on civil wars incorporate diasporas in
their models as external nonstate actors in intrastate conflicts (Adamson 2002,
2013; Brinkerhoff 2009, 2011; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Hall 2015; Kaldor 2001;
Koinova 2011; Lyons 2006; Shain 2002; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Salehyan
2007; Smith and Stares 2007). Other scholars address diaspora mobilization from
a transnational social movement perspective, seeking to explain conditions and
causal mechanisms for mobilization (Adamson 2002, 2013; Koinova 2009, 2014,
So¨kefeld 2006; Quinsaat 2013; Wayland 2004). This article calls attention to the
need to analyze diaspora movements from relational and positional perspectives
and highlights the importance of positional analysis.
Does diaspora embeddedness in different contexts affect the trajectories for
transnational mobilization, and if so, how? I argue that the concept of diaspora
positionality—the power diaspora political agents perceive themselves or are per-
ceived as deriving from their sociospatial positions in a particular context—has a
strong potential to account for diaspora mobilization, though it has not been
greatly discussed in scholarly analyses. Positionality as a sociospatial concept offers
opportunities to analyze diaspora politics beyond statist paradigms, which are domi-
nated by analyses of triadic relationships between diasporas, host states (immigra-
tion states), and home states (sending states). Diasporas have linkages to many con-
texts beyond host states and original home states. I argue that such linkages
structure their relationships globally and endow them with different powers derived
from different contexts. If diaspora political agents perceive themselves or are per-
ceived as deriving relatively strong powers to achieve homeland-oriented goals from
a particular sociospatial context, they are more likely to engage in institutional poli-
tics and pursue their claims through state-based and supranational channels, in
what McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001, 7–8) call “contained contention.” If they
perceive themselves or are perceived as deriving weak powers from a context, they
are more likely to engage with activist networks and to pursue claims through both
“contained” and “transgressive” contention.
I base my understanding of the term diaspora on Adamson and Demetriou: “a
social collectivity that exists across state borders and that has succeeded over time
to: 1) sustain a collective national, cultural, or religious identity through a sense of
internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and 2) dis-
play an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity
through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links”
(2007, 497). I use the term for nonhomogeneous social collectivities of migration
waves, generations, social strata, and active or inactive members. Diaspora political
agents are individual and institutional agents who actively make political claims on
behalf of their original homelands. Diaspora mobilization designates the pursuit of
claims and practices related to the original homelands through various trajectories—
institutional or activist channels—and a variety of means, ranging from moderate
(“contained”) to more radical (“transgressive) politics or a combination thereof.
This article presents a new positional perspective for the analysis of diaspora
mobilization in IR scholarship and seeks to shift debates beyond realist, liberalist,
and constructivist thinking. The conceptual discussion focuses on four major
aspects of diaspora positionality—relativity, power, fluidity, and perception—and
juxtaposes positionality with closely related concepts such as proximity/distance
and position in a social network. Patterns of mobilization trajectories may depend
on the perceived powers diaspora political agents derive from the contexts in
which they are embedded. The discussion is illustrated with empirical evidence
from patterns of mobilization of two conflict-generated diasporas—Armenian and
Palestinian—for genocide recognition and statehood, respectively. I do not
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engage with causal inference, but demonstrate patterns of institutional and activist
mobilization trajectories, associated with relatively weak or strong diaspora posi-
tionality in different contexts. I conclude by suggesting how diaspora positionality
may apply to other cases.
Transnational Diaspora Politics and IR Theories
During the 2000s, studies in the IR realist tradition began to recognize diasporas
as important external actors, in particular, their role as resources for mobilization
purposes. Diasporas can finance local factions, purchase and smuggle weapons,
provide sanctuary to rebels, and recruit soldiers. A seminal large-N World Bank
study showed that affluent diasporas can perpetuate long-term civil wars (Collier
and Hoeffler 2000). Qualitative studies of the Armenian, Chechen, Kosovar, Sikh,
Somali, Tamil, and other conflict-generated diasporas showed that intrastate con-
flicts resist resolution, since rebels reach to diasporas for financial support
(Adamson 2002; Brinkerhoff 2011; Fair 2005; Kaldor 2001; Lyons 2006; Shain
2002; Shain and Barth 2003). Rebel groups with transnational constituencies
based on kinship or religion are more likely to receive foreign support than
others (Salehyan et al. 2011, 709). Refugees often facilitate the spread of arms,
combatants, and ideologies; alter the ethnic composition of the host state; and
exacerbate economic competition (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, 335). Civil war
is likely to spread when foreign agencies give resources to militarized refugees
(Lischer 2005).
Realist theories consider diasporas as providing material power to radicalize
intrastate conflicts from abroad or contribute to postconflict processes. This
approach is limited in several ways, however. Emphasizing the primacy of material
power renders other forms of power less relevant for diaspora mobilization. The
theoretical implications are that diasporas with access to material resources are
likely to be mobilized themselves or to be sought after for mobilization by exter-
nal actors. It is not clear whether or not they will be mobilized through institu-
tional or activist trajectories. Diaspora linkages to specific contexts are not
factored in the analysis, even if studies observe that the effects of diaspora mobili-
zation in geographically contiguous regions (Salehyan 2007, 55) and remote loca-
tions through “long-distance nationalism” (Anderson 1992, 1–10) are quite differ-
ent (Cederman et al. 2013, 393). Moreover, even if realist accounts acknowledge
extraterritorial relationships and diasporas as nonstate actors, the state—primarily
the original home state—remains central in the analysis.
Other theories seek to integrate transnational diaspora politics into various IR
paradigms. Shain and Barth (2003, 459) emphasize that mobilization can be
studied in the theoretical space between liberalism and constructivism, because of
the diaspora’s position “outside the state” but “inside the people.” Liberalism
rejects the idea that states are unitary actors, asserting that identity-based and
other interest groups formulate the state’s international preferences through the
domestic political process (Shain and Barth 2003, 457–60; Shain 2007). This proc-
ess is especially relevant for a liberal host state, where diasporas are relatively free
to engage in political activities (Adamson 2002, 162; Kozlowski 2005, 12). Some
diasporas succeed in foreign policy lobbying when they are well organized, find
executive and legislative permeability, and advocate policies the government
already favors (Haney and Vanderbush 1999, 345). Host states can experience
policy capture by lobbies (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007), promote democracy
(Shain 1999), and intervene in secessionist conflicts in response to demands from
domestic constituencies (Saideman 1997).
The strength of liberalism is in the unpacking of host-state processes and in demon-
strating the lobbying capacities of diasporas. However, this approach is still domi-
nated by statist approaches to ethnic lobbies and the foreign policy of a host state,
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especially in the United States, without factoring in transnational linkages
between diasporas and contexts elsewhere. Such transnational linkages either are
not part of the analysis or are mentioned but considered of little analytical value.
The analysis is also tilted toward discussing mobilization through institutional
channels rather than grassroots activism.
Constructivism’s emphasis on nonstate actors and social processes beyond the
state (Wendt 1999) offers further room to theorize about diaspora mobilization.
Constructivism factors in the multitude of diaspora identities that change through
interactions between actors and their environment; social processes affect rela-
tions between actors themselves, and internal processes shape individual identities
(Shain and Barth 2003, 458). Power is not only materially based and resource ori-
ented but symbolic, derived from the “authority to determine the shared meanings
that constitute identities, interests, and practices of states” (Adler 1997, 336;
Shain 2007, 137). It can be embedded in individual agency (Brinkerhoff 2016),
and aid not only conflicts but postconflict processes with remittances, financial
investments, philanthropy, and leadership for postconflict institutions
(Brinkerhoff 2008; Lyons 2006; Orjuella 2008; Van Hear 2003). Diasporas can
also have deterritorialized identities and participate in identity formation with the
identities of nation-states (Adamson and Demetriou 2007, 491–92).
Scholars working with transnational diaspora mobilization have drawn exten-
sively from IR constructivist accounts, which have integrated transnational social
movements in their analysis. Parallels have been drawn between diasporas and
human rights groups, which pressure their governments through “boomerang”
(Keck and Sikkink 1998) and “spiral” effects (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), as
diasporas could be used as external agents to pressure domestic governments to
implement political change. Diasporas mobilize when global and local opportu-
nity structures open and reframe local issues to appeal to global actors (Bob 2005;
Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink.
1999; Tarrow 2005). These scholars argue that diaspora mobilization differs from
transnational social movements because a particularistic rather than universalistic
identity is being mobilized (Koinova 2009; Adamson 2013). But it resembles them
in many other ways. Political entrepreneurs are crucial for such movements
(Adamson 2002; Brinkerhoff 2011). They may be leaders of diaspora organiza-
tions or informal leaders beyond organizations. They may raise diaspora con-
sciousness to maintain its identity or motivate it to act on homeland-oriented
goals (Shain and Barth 2003). They act on local and global political opportunity
structures (Adamson 2013; Cochrane 2015; Koinova 2011, 2014; Øestergaard-
Nielsen 2001; Smith and Stares 2007; Wayland 2004); use mobilizing structures or
formal organizational forms or networks; or become transnational brokers connect-
ing networks (Wayland 2004; Koinova 2011; Adamson 2013). They use framing to
reach and expand the message to specific audiences (Wayland 2004; Smith and
Stares 2007; Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Koinova 2011) and build domestic or
transnational coalitions to achieve common goals.
Constructivist accounts focus on diasporas as nonstate actors and stress that dia-
spora identities need not be treated as essential categories, but have gaps similar
to those of other IR theories regarding the context in which diasporas are
embedded. They consider that diaspora political agents are endowed with more
individual agency than is available through their symbolic powers and do not
address whether or not diasporas will mobilize more through institutional or acti-
vist trajectories. Depending on the sociospatial position diaspora political agents
occupy in particular contexts, they will be endowed with different powers to act
on opportunities or constraints.
In sum, none of the theoretical debates in IR can entirely account for trajectories
of diaspora mobilization. Anchored in considerations of utility and material
power, realist accounts nevertheless acknowledge that diasporic identities underpin
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cross-border kinship networks and exert impacts on neighboring states and the
international system. Liberalist accounts unpack interactions between diaspora
political agents and a host state, but acknowledge that diaspora identities are inter-
twined with the organizational and material power of diaspora political agents.
Finally, constructivist and transnational social movement accounts cannot neglect
the importance of diasporas as sources of material power in a political struggle, and
they acknowledge that diaspora political agents lobby host states and home states
on an equal footing with transnational mobilization. Even if scholars seek to embed
their work in one grand theoretical approach, in reality there is no perfect fit and
their theorizing incorporates assumptions from various paradigms.
Several prominent scholars have recently concluded that IR theory anchored in
macrotheoretic paradigms of realism, liberalism, and constructivism may have reached
its limits. Whether because aggregate paradigms “lack shared incommensurable con-
tent,” with effective explanations cutting across them (Jackson and Nexon 2009, 908);
or because specific puzzles necessitate Sil and Katzenstein’s “analytical eclecticism”
(2010) to account for factors and concrete causal mechanisms (Bennett 2013, 460–
61); or because they do not factor in reflexivity (Brown 2013), grand theories have
opened space for mid-range theories. These fall traditionally under comparative poli-
tics, focusing on comparisons of states and more recently substate units such as cities
and regions. Midrange theories are a growing IR trend (Lake 2013, 568).
In this article I speak to a cluster of midrange sociopositional theories and
emphasize the need to think in positional terms when analyzing diaspora mobili-
zation. Some of these theories focus broadly on interactions between agents, and
how endogenous processes lead to continuity and change of phenomena as
diverse as imperial orders (Nexon and Wright 2007; Nexon 2009), conflict resolu-
tion and peace-building (Goddard 2009, 2012), rebellion (Staniland 2014),
democratization (Stroschein 2012), and informally institutionalized conflict
dynamics (Koinova 2013), among others. To varying degrees these works relate to
sociological studies, building on the ideas of Emirbayer (1997) about relational
sociology and Tilly (1998) and McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) about transac-
tional approaches to social movements. Network theories emphasize the impor-
tance of position occupied by specific actors. Power is not associated with material
or symbolic resources, but is embedded in the position political agents occupy
between fragmented networks, allowing them to act as brokers when bridging
structural gaps (Adamson 2013; Brinkerhoff 2016; Burt 1992; Goddard 2009).
Degree centrality in networks can be associated with social power, as actors
“withhold social benefits such as membership” and “enact social sanctions as a
method of coercion” (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006, 11). Power can also
be wielded by actors on the margins of a network, with options to exit the network
and break unwanted links with central nodes (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and
Montgomery 2009, 572). The crux of these theories is to consider power as
derived from a system of ties in which agents are embedded and to demonstrate
that interactions among ties define but do not determine agent behaviors. As dis-
cussed below, diaspora positionality is different from position in a network, yet it
exemplifies agency in a system of ties developed globally among diasporas
embedded in different contexts, beyond traditionally considered host and home
states. The theory of diaspora sociospatial positionality speaks to a growing under-
standing of the need to challenge a triadic relationship between diasporas, host
states, and home states, as diasporas mobilize in a variety of spaces—such as cities,
online, refugee camps, supranational organizations, sites of global visibility, in
spaces contiguous to or distant from the homeland (Brinkerhoff 2009; Adamson
2016; Brkanic 2016; Koinova and Karabegovic 2016; Kok and Rogers 2016; Van
Hear and Cohen 2016; Gabiam and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016).
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Diasporas and Sociospatial Positionality: Conceptual Discussion
This section outlines the characteristics of diaspora positionality as a social-spatial
phenomenon, along with several closely related sociospatial concepts. It also
addresses how positionality relates to agency and structure and implications for
diaspora mobilization.
The term positionality originates in feminist theory. Gender, ethnic, racial, and
religious identities are defined not simply as essentialist categories of individuals,
but as positions these individuals occupy in a set of relationships (Haraway 1988;
Maher and Tetreault 1993; Nagar and Geiger 2007). The external context in which
agents are embedded determines their power vis-a-vis others, as a pawn on a chess-
board is considered dangerous, powerful, or weak depending on its relationship to
other chess pieces (Alcoff 1988, 433). Embeddedness in social locations has impli-
cations for effective attachments and sense of belonging (Anthias 2008, 15).
Feminism discusses identity-based positionalities but not others. Economic geog-
raphers have sought to close this gap by discussing how agents’ knowledge is
embedded sociospatially in different contexts and how such embeddedness endows
them with powers vis-a-vis other agents with whom they interact (Sheppard 2002,
318). Global processes connect distant places, create linkages with some places
more than others, and foster geographic inequalities in the global economy. These
linkages can reproduce power relations in a path-dependent manner (319).
I take these debates further by defining the term diaspora positionality to capture
the power diaspora political agents perceive themselves or are perceived as deriv-
ing from the sociospatial context in which they are embedded through a system
of ties to hostlands, homelands, and other global locations where diasporic breth-
ren live. Diaspora political agents operate in what sociologists call “transnational
social fields” (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004), adding a transnational dimension
to Bourdieu’s ideas about the “social field” as a domain within the state where the
repeated formal and informal interactions between individuals and institutions
structure their positions of power (Bourdieu 1985). They also operate in
“transnational social spaces” (Faist 1998), with different states and subunits within
them, such as cities, villages, and regions. The key point of this article is that sus-
tained ties among diasporas in these transnational fields structure their relation-
ships and endow diaspora political agents with different powers depending on the
linkages they maintain with specific contexts. Diaspora activists might physically
live in a host country, but have weak linkages to it, while maintaining thicker link-
ages to a homeland or to a third context where diasporic brethren live. A disjunc-
ture between physical residence and sociospatial linkages need not be the rule, as
diaspora political agents might have thick linkages to a hostland as well. Yet such
a disjuncture is indicative that diaspora activists are empowered by the contexts in
which they maintain thicker linkages in sociospatial terms; they might have more
person-to-person interactions, stronger institutional affiliations, and more abilities
to draw on material and symbolic resources from that context, and to interpret
meanings related to it, among others.
By employing the concept of positionality, I account for political phenomena
beyond observations that diasporas act as “rooted cosmopolitans” (Tarrow 2005),
formulate claims transnationally yet organize activities in specific neighborhoods
(Nagel and Staeheli 2010), and act in line with “division of labor,” utilizing differ-
ent segments of their network to pursue shared political goals (Adamson and
Demetriou, 2007; Lyons and Mandaville 2010). I argue that a relatively strong
positionality vis-a-vis a certain context—whether hostland, homeland, or a third
location—endows diaspora political agents with more capacity to pursue
homeland-oriented goals through institutional channels and “high” politics, espe-
cially in liberal societies. A relatively weak positionality is more likely to be associ-
ated with grassroots activism staged locally or transnationally.
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Figure 1 illustrates the nonstatist perspective used in this article. Diaspora politi-
cal agents in hostland context E are linked not simply to home state context A,
but also to diaspora brethren living in other contexts (B, C, D, F, G). These rela-
tionships challenge statist thinking about a triangular relationship between dia-
sporas, host state, and home state, and include a multitude of other contexts. The
arrows point to the interactions among diaspora political agents in a transnational
social field that spans multiple state and substate contexts.
Diaspora Positionality in Juxtaposition to Other Spatial Concepts
Sheppard (2002) argues that three important aspects define sociospatial position-
ality: relativity, power, and fluidity. Positionality is relative, since “the conditions of
possibility for an agent depend on his or her position with respect to others”
(2002, 318). Diaspora positionality addresses the fact that diaspora political agents
with strong links to a particular context might have specific value for other agents
in the transnational social field: “Space is more than geography” (Beck, Gleditsch
and Beardsley 2006, 27). Embedded in a certain context, diaspora political agents
can take advantage of a conglomeration of unique sociospatial characteristics of
that place, such as institutions, networks, resources (Adamson and Koinova 2013),
political culture, infrastructure, regime, history, position of the state in the inter-
national system, and others. This is because “places are sites where people live,
work, and move, and where they form attachments, practice their relations with
each other, and relate to the rest of the world” (Massey 1991; see also Leitner
et al. 2008, 161). Linkages to certain contexts could provide a relatively better
position to pursue certain homeland-oriented goals (see Adamson and
Demetriou 2007; Lyons and Mandaville 2010; Koinova 2012). For instance, a dia-
spora embedded in a country with a pluralist interest representation system might
be more inclined to lobby than if it were embedded in a country with a corpora-
tist interest representation system. This was the case of Kosovar political activists
seeking state independence, who focused on the United States, a context condu-
cive for lobbying (Koinova 2013). Diaspora political agents embedded in a global
city such as London are more prone to mobilize a variety of networks (Adamson
and Koinova 2013) than their brethren in smaller urban or rural areas.
FC
G
A
DB
E
Figure 1. Diaspora positionality in a transnational social field.
A. Homeland.
B, D, F, G. Diasporas in different hostlands/other contexts z.
E. Diaspora in a reference context.
Arrows. Relational ties between diaspora in context E vis-a-vis agents in homeland and
diasporas in other contexts.
External boundary line. Delineation of the transnational social field of sustained inter-
actions among different agents.
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The relativity aspect concerns not only where diaspora political agents are placed,
but also what kind of linkages they maintain to the reference context. The geographi-
cal proximity or distance of diaspora activists to a particular context, measured in
Euclidean terms, does not necessarily determine that they will have strong or weak
linkages to that context. Research has shown that dense connectivity shortens distan-
ces and facilitates diffusion of ideas and practices between agents in different con-
texts (Gleditsch 2002; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Katzenstein 2005); see Figure 2.
The geographical (Euclidean) distance between political agents embedded in con-
texts A and D is shorter (500 km) than that between D and B (1,500 km) and D and
C (7,500 km). Yet sustained interactions between D and B and between D and C
shorten the sociospatial distance between the agents forming the respective dyads.
In transnational diaspora politics, linkages between diaspora political agents
based in different contexts can be thick or thin, depending on the frequencies
and nature of exchanges. Thick linkages occur when agents are involved in sus-
tained interactions with frequent communication, societal integration, travel
between locales, circular migration, joint participation and planning of events,
and other common activities. Thin linkages are usually limited to communication
patterns in which ideas and information are exchanged with little strategic and
tactical involvement. The thickness of linkages affects the sociospatial distance of
diaspora political agents from a reference context, rendering their positionality
relatively strong or weak vis-a-vis that context. For example, diaspora political
agents living in Brussels potentially have a better comparative advantage to lobby
European Union (EU) institutions than if they lived in London. Their positional-
ity will nevertheless be relatively weak if they do not maintain regular interactions
with EU institutions, networks, and policy makers.
Power is the second defining characteristic of positionality, as some positions are
more influential than others (Sheppard 2002, 318). The power of diaspora politi-
cal agents is influenced but not determined by the material, institutional, and
symbolic resources in a specific place. The power of diaspora activists is also not
exercised in line with Dahl’s classic definition: “A has power over B to the extent
that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (1957, 202–3).
Diaspora political agents embedded in particular contexts have no capacity to
coerce other agents to lobby institutionally or engage in grassroots activism. They
D 
 
 
 
500 
km 
7.500 
km 
1,500 
km 
A 
B 
C 
Figure 2. Geographical distance.
A, B, C. Diasporas in different contexts.
D. Homeland.
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have no direct authority relationship. Power is also not to be found “everywhere,”
in the Foucauldian sense, diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge, and
“regimes of truth” (Foucault 1991; Rabinow 1991). Power is clearly positioned in spe-
cific locations of the transnational social field in which diasporas operate. Power in
positionality is rather what Lukes (2005, 2007), Berenskoetter and Williams (2007),
and Ringmar (2007) call “power to,” the empowerment of agents to achieve certain
goals, in this case homeland-oriented goals, through embeddedness in a particular
context. The sociospatial characteristics of this context—institutions, networks,
resources (Adamson and Koinova 2013), political culture, infrastructure, regime,
position of state in the international system, and others—and the linkages to it pro-
vide the power base for diaspora political agents to mobilize.
The third characteristic of positionality is fluidity (Sheppard 2002). Positionality
can change depending on changing opportunities and constraints in the refer-
ence context and the linkages diaspora activists maintain to it. Linkages to partic-
ular contexts might be assigned more or less relevance for the achievement of a
homeland-oriented goal, or become stronger or weaker over time. For example,
for the goal of achieving statehood, Kosovo political agents did not seek the US-
based diaspora after the 2008 proclamation of independence. They shifted their
lobbying efforts to the UK-based diaspora, embedded in a EU-member state and
considered in this period of more value for lobbying other EU members that had
not yet recognized Kosovo’s statehood.
Positionality is also a perceptional category that captures not an objective state of
affairs, but subjective perceptions of agents. To help elucidate the perceptional prop-
erty of positionality, I juxtapose it to a position in a network, a spatial concept with
recent IR attention (see Figure 3). In network theory, a position of power commands
high centrality or thick interconnectedness with other parts of the network; weaker
positions are less connected and more marginal. A network position has objective
properties, measured by number of ties, centrality (eigenvector and in-between cen-
trality), and patterns of participation in clusters of relationships with other nodes.
Power is embedded in a node or clusters of nodes in different parts of the network.
Two actors may be close or far apart in a network but have structurally equivalent
A 
B
C
Figure 3. Position in a social network
A. Node in a position of high degree centrality with ties to numerous other nodes.
B, C. Nodes in positions of structural equivalence, as they connect similar constella-
tions of notes in the system of relationships.
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positions if they share patterns of ties with other actors (Hafner-Burton and
Montgomery 2006; Cao 2010).
Positionality is different from position in a social network, since there are no
objective measurements. Subjective interpretations about how power is embedded
in specific contexts can affect how actors relate to those contexts. Diaspora politi-
cal agents can perceive the strength of social contacts in some instances as deriv-
ing from strong institutional connections and proximity to the majority race and
religion in a hostland (Koinova 2014), and in others from the thickness of link-
ages to an original homeland or another context.
Agency, Structure, and Implications of Positionality for Diaspora Mobilization
I argue that contexts in which diaspora political agents are embedded shape their
behaviors but are not deterministic. The relationship between diaspora agents and
context can be uneven; perceptions can be similar or diverge, and linkages can be
thicker for some diaspora activists and thinner for others. Linkages to a sociospatial
context do not necessarily mean they will be utilized to achieve benefits; political
agents need autonomous will to actualize potential power from a context. Lukes argues
that “power to” achieve—in this case a homeland-oriented goal—is “a potentiality,
not an actuality—indeed a potentiality that may never be actualized” (2005, 69).
With such options, how do we look at a particular diaspora when seeking to
analyze its trajectories for mobilization? First, a diaspora is not a monolithic entity;
thus, one cannot make analytical judgments about a diaspora per se, but only
about the multitude of diaspora agents engaged in the mobilization process.
Aggregation of diaspora political agents’ perceptions may nevertheless take place,
in line with what Sen (1993) considers “positional objectivity,” as people in the
same position are more likely to make the same observations or judgments.
Diaspora activists could similarly view the sociospatial characteristics of the con-
text—institutions, networks, resources (Adamson and Koinova 2013), political cul-
ture, infrastructure, history, position of the state in international system, and so
on—and their linkages to that context as empowering or disempowering them to
achieve certain homeland-oriented goals. Aggregation of individual views could
then take place without essentializing diasporas and without ascribing to them
collective perceptions or powers.
Second, there are implications for the mobilization trajectories if diaspora polit-
ical agents consider themselves empowered through a particular context. If their
positionality is relatively strong vis-a-vis a reference context, they are more likely
to engage in institutional politics, pursued through state-based and supranational
channels and through what McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001, 7–8) call
“contained contention.” These actions are observable in nonviolent rhetoric, peti-
tions, demonstrations, media, public documents, and lobbying. If their positional-
ity is relatively weak vis-a-vis the reference context, political agents are likely to be
either disengaged or engaged with activist networks, other migrants, and civil and
(un)civil society agents, in a local or transnational context. Such transactions can
take place through contained or transgressive contention—episodic, public, col-
lective interactions in which at least some parties are newly identified actors and
adopt “unprecedented or forbidden” means (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 7–
8). Repertoires could include boycotts, violent demonstrations, recruitment of
fighters, arms purchases, and fundraising for overt or covert agendas.
The mechanisms that link positionality and modes of mobilization are beyond
the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that positions of power
tend to reproduce themselves (Sheppard 2002, 319). Diaspora agents with rela-
tively strong positionality would tend to reproduce links through interactions with
elites from above; agents with relatively weak positionality would tend to
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reproduce interactions with nonelite agents from below. Even in the same place,
city, or nation-state, diaspora political agents with different positionalities might
show different trajectories of mobilization.
Diasporas and Sociospatial Positionality: Empirical Examples
This section illustrates the conceptual components of sociospatial positionality
with empirical evidence from the mobilizations of the Armenian and Palestinian
diasporas. Both are conflict-generated and linked to polities experiencing con-
tested sovereignty. The notion of homeland incorporates not only original home-
lands such as Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Palestine, but also neighboring
territories where ethnic brethren live. The transnational social field in which dia-
spora political agents operate incorporates original homelands, de facto states,
neighboring territories, and diasporas across the globe. Both cases exemplify pat-
terns of relatively strong and weak positionalities vis-a-vis different contexts, likely
to be associated with specific mobilization trajectories emanating from them. The
empirical data are illustrative and do not engage in causal analysis, which needs
to be conducted in the future regarding specific puzzles and contexts. These cases
do show that approaches focused solely on a triangular relationship between dia-
sporas, home states, and host states do not account for these relationships, and
that scholarship needs to include sociopositional reasoning about the embedded-
ness of diasporas in specific contexts and how it shapes mobilization trajectories.
Methodologically, this article builds on both secondary literature and extensive
fieldwork in the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany (2009–
2015), informed by more than 120 semistructured interviews. The main body of
data was collected between 2013 and 2015 in English, Swedish, and German.
Respondents were selected through open sources and snowball sampling on the
basis of their formal and informal participation in political claim making for rele-
vant homeland political goals. The interviews were semistructured and included
demographic information capturing individual characteristics of diaspora political
agents and sections on hostland migration integration regimes, political lobbying
through the institutions of the state and transnational channels, and transna-
tional engagement through person-to-person networks and supranational and
global institutions. Interviews were anonymized to protect the respondents’ identi-
ties, in line with research ethics requirements.
Armenian Diaspora Mobilization for Genocide Recognition
A century ago the collapsing Ottoman Empire massacred and exposed to death in
the Syrian desert an estimated 800,000 to 1.5 million Armenians. The Armenian
genocide has been recognized by the European Parliament, parliaments or gov-
ernments of twenty-three countries, and numerous key institutions and political
figures. It is officially denied by the successor state of the Ottoman Empire,
Turkey, despite a growing movement for recognition in its civil society. It is not
denied but still not recognized by other states. Recognition has shaped the rela-
tionship between the Armenian diaspora and the independent state of Armenia
since 1992, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh (1992–1994), and its aftermath.
A well-mobilized Armenian diaspora has maintained memory for a century
(To¨lo¨lyan 2000; Sheffer 2003). The United States, France, and Lebanon were the
largest migration destinations for genocide survivors and became hubs for
migrants from later waves. The conflict-generated diasporas in these countries
formed durable linkages with other diasporas in Europe and the Middle East
based on memories passed through families. They built three major transnational
diaspora parties (Panossian 1998; To¨lo¨lyan 2000; Shain 2002) with the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation’s (Dashnak) most influential.
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Positionality is a relative concept, as diaspora political agents have thicker link-
ages to certain contexts than to others. The Armenian diaspora in Russia, for
example, formed on the basis of migration from territories of the former Soviet
Union and Armenia proper (Galkina 2006, 181), is the largest (estimated at above
one million), and Russia is the most important emigration destination for
Armenians except for the United States. Yet Armenian diaspora agents in Russia
have much less global influence regarding genocide recognition than their breth-
ren in other contexts. Linkages between the Armenian diaspora in Russia and
Armenia proper are thicker than those to eastern Turkey, a place of memory
where genocide took place. Such thickness could be attributed to durable trans-
national interactions, also involving circular migration especially regarding
Moscow, where an estimated 60,000–1,000,000 Armenians live. Fluctuation of
numbers is not surprising, as many jobs are temporary (Grigoryan 2014). To
invoke the distinction between positionality and proximity/distance, Armenians
in Russia are geographically closer to Turkey than to their brethren in the United
States or France, but sociospatially more distant. Armenians in Russia, while
numerous and well linked to Armenia proper, have relatively weak positionality
vis-a-vis this context to pursue genocide recognition. They remain with relatively
little political mobilization.
To further elucidate the relativity aspect, I show elsewhere thicker linkages to
the United Kingdom as another reference context. Armenian diaspora agents in
the United Kingdom consider their positionality relatively strong because of con-
nectivities on several levels. The diaspora is partly assimilated (Walker 2009, ix)
and highly integrated in British society (George 2009, 67–69), including through
citizenship. Armenian identity is considered complementary to that of British citi-
zens (Ohanian 2009); the social distance to the majority is relatively small due to
similarities in race and religion, and Armenians enjoy a good media reputation
compared to other diaspora groups. A relatively strong positionality, despite UK
resistance to officially recognizing the 1915 killings as genocide, has been
Table 1. Empirical application of the theory of sociospatial diaspora positionality
Armenian diaspora Palestinian diaspora
Relativity Thicker linkages to Western countries on
genocide recognition issues than to
Russia, despite high population
numbers
Thicker linkages to Lebanon from
Palestinians in Germany and
Scandinavian countries; to the West
Bank and Gaza from United Kingdom
and United States; and to Gulf states
from United Kingdom and France
Power Empowerment through context in
France and the United States, but dis-
empowerment in Germany despite
high population numbers
Empowerment through context in the
United Kingdom, but disempower-
ment in Germany and the United
States, despite high population
numbers
Fluidity Shifts of empowerment away from
Lebanon during and after the
Lebanese civil war
Shifts of empowerment of the PLO from
Egypt to Lebanon to Jordan to Tunesia
Perception In the same context, Germany, percep-
tions of relatively weak positionality
among Armenians from Turkey and of
relatively strong positionality among
Armenians from Iran
In the same context, the United
Kingdom, perceptions of relatively
strong positionality among secular and
Islamic networks operating in the
transnational social field to affect
Palestinian affairs in different global
locations
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associated with diaspora political agents engaging primarily in lobbying through
institutional channels (Koinova 2014). Activists, including the Armenian Church
and Community Council, have built on earlier contacts through the British-
Armenian All Party Parliamentary Group in the House of Lords and organized vis-
its of parliamentarians to the Armenian Genocide Memorial in Yerevan (ACCUK
2014). In 2015 Baroness Caroline Cox, traditionally engaged in Armenian issues,
asked the government to openly recognize the killings as genocide (HART 2015).
Pressure exerted via the Freedom of Information Act revealed ministerial conver-
sations regarding whether or not it should do so. Despite relatively low numbers
(around 20,000), diaspora political agents utilized strong positionality vis-a-vis the
host state to lobby institutions rather than protests or transgressive contentious
politics.
Armenian diaspora political agents in the United States and France are in a
much more powerful position to mobilize than those in Russia and the United
Kingdom. Their contexts create power potentialities that might not be available
elsewhere, but diaspora activists need to opt consciously to actualize them. The
United States is a global power in the international system. Diaspora embedded-
ness in a global power creates potentialities to affect politics in more influential
ways than if positioned in a peripheral state. Moreover, the US pluralist system
facilitates relatively easy building and sustaining of lobbies. Armenians have been
well integrated in the United States, and diaspora political agents have recognized
and acted on the opportunities available in this context. Although they number
only 483,366 (ACS 2011), they have built a powerful lobby, compared to the more
numerous but less influential Chinese- and Arab-Americans. The lobby has been a
major driving force for genocide recognition, also advocating stronger US-
Armenian relations and less military and economic aid to Turkey.
Given US foreign policy interests in keeping relations with Turkey as a North
Atlantic Treaty Organization member and ally in the war against global terrorism,
Armenian lobbying in the United States is not easy, but it has been remarkably
sustained. Lobby organizations have put concerted efforts toward congressional
resolutions and presidential statements and called on President Obama to charac-
terize the 1915 events as genocide in the 2015 State of the Union message. The
diaspora political agents’ embeddedness in a global power also shapes how others
in the transnational social field perceive them. Armenian-American institutions
became major leaders alongside authorities in Armenia in the 2014–2015 global
campaign for genocide recognition. Armenia’s foreign ministry characterized the
2014 congressional resolution as an “important step on the way to restoration of
historical truth” (MFA 2014). Diaspora activists in European countries looked to
US activities and occasionally sought formal or informal partnerships (R1 2015;
R2 2013).1 US-based celebrities such as Kim Kardashian and Kanye West, who vis-
ited the genocide memorial in Yerevan in April 2015, attracted global attention
(Walker 2015). Popular celebrities have been sought after as public diplomats to
take political stances on genocide recognition.
Estimated at 350,000–400,000 (Akgonul 2003), Armenians in France lead
Europe in campaigning for genocide recognition. The French context empowers
diaspora political agents to pursue genocide recognition in a different way from
elsewhere. Here cultural production and historical legacies of host-state support
for genocide survivors are of high importance. Numerous Armenians with careers
in entertainment, literature, and music act as diplomats for genocide recognition
and support for an independent Armenia. Most notable is singer Charles
Aznavour, who built a charitable foundation to support victims of the 1988
1 Respondent 1 (R1) 2015. Armenian activist in Frankfurt close to the AGBU, author’s telephone interview, 26
October; and R2. 2013. Armenian youth activist close to HAYDAT, author’s interview, June 14, Amsterdam,
Netherlands.
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Armenian earthquake and supported Armenia’s independence and genocide rec-
ognition and in 2009 was appointed ambassador to Switzerland. France in 2001
was among the first countries to recognize the genocide with a special law and
even sought to criminalize its denial in 2011 (Willsher 2012). The constitutional
court ruled the law unconstitutional on grounds of contravening freedom of
speech, but a new draft bill was submitted to parliament (News.am 2015).
President Franc¸ois Hollande has been an outspoken world leader directly urging
Turkey to recognize the genocide.
In contrast, Armenian diaspora political agents in Germany have considered
their positionality relatively weak. In this country Armenians are relatively few,
estimated at 50,000–60,000 (Embassy of the republic of Armenia 2015), but more
than in the United Kingdom. They are organized in church societies, parties, and
nonprofit and youth organizations. For example, The Rhein-Main area, where
many Armenians live, has forty-two officially registered organizations (Armenian
Church 2015). Nevertheless, at the time of fieldwork in 2015, activists point to a
major impediment to lobbying efforts in this context: the unresolved relationship
between Germany and its past (R3 and R4 2015).2 Aligned with the Ottoman gov-
ernment at the time of the genocide, some German officials were informed and
even complicit about the mass killings (Hosfeld 2013; Hoffmann 2015).
Acquiring citizenship has also been more difficult in Germany than in other coun-
tries in Europe, and powerful Turkish organizations have been considered an
impediment because they may publicly bring up antigenocide claims. As a result,
diaspora political agents have not lobbied as successfully as in other countries.
They attribute more impact to Pope Francis’s statement endorsing genocide des-
ignation (Yardley and Arsu 2015), to German politicians, and to Bundestag delib-
erations about the “genocide resolution” (BBC 2015) and its eventual recognition
in 2016, than to their own lobbying (R5 2015).3 Their activism has been primarily
targeted toward educating the larger German public.
Sociospatial diaspora positionality can be fluid, depending on changing aspects
of the reference context or pursuit of specific goals. Such fluidity is well observed
in the Lebanese context. Lebanon accommodated survivors, established parties,
and in 1955 opened Haigazian University in Beirut, the first Armenian university
outside Armenia. A memorial was erected in 1965, and the genocide was officially
recognized in 2000 (Auron 2003). Diaspora political agents lost their crucial his-
torical role because of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990), when Armenians
migrated en masse to the United States, France, and other European countries.
But the Bourj Hammoud area in Beirut had earlier exported cultural productions
to the rest of the diaspora. Armenians in Lebanon now watch TV from the
Republic of Armenia (Migliorino 2008) and cultural productions from France
and the United States. Lebanon as a reference context and its diaspora positional-
ity role have changed, even if the goal of genocide recognition has not.
Finally, even if they are located in the same country, diaspora political agents can
have different perceptions, depending on individual sociospatial linkages. In Germany,
several respondents perceived themselves as inhibited from pursuing genocide recog-
nition because they had arrived from Turkey, where many were assimilated and
needed to learn the Armenian language and customs in the host country (R6 2015).4
A few with origins in Iran felt more empowered in Germany, with more international
contacts, and pursued activities on issues beyond genocide recognition, such as sup-
port for political and social processes in Nagorno-Karabakh (R4 2015).5 Nevertheless,
2 R3. 2015. Academic and activist, author’s interview, April 21, Berlin, Germany; and R4. 2015. Armenian activist,
author’s interview, April 16, Berlin, Germany.
3 R5. 2015. Armenian community leader, author’s interview, April 23, Berlin, Germany.
4 R6. 2015. Armenian activist close to a civic organization, author’s interview, April 10, Berlin, Germany.
5 R4. 2015. Armenian activist, author’s interview, April 16, Berlin, Germany.
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living in Germany, they perceived themselves as challenged in lobbying German poli-
ticians. They displayed a degree of Sen (1993)’s “positional objectivity,” because of
aggregation of their views in the same country.
Palestinian Diaspora Mobilization for Statehood
The 1948 war for Israeli independence displaced 711,000 Palestinians (UN 1950)
and was the defining moment for a Palestinian diaspora. Recurrent violence
made more than 4.7 million Palestinian refugees eligible for UNRWA services
(2010). During the first intifada (uprising), the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) was the major diaspora-based organization making claims for
liberation of Palestine, primarily through armed struggle (Hijazi 1986). After the
1993 Oslo Accords, which created the Palestinian Authority with limited self-
government in the West Bank and Gaza strip, the PLO became part of the peace
process. It remained active in the diaspora, but its influence waned. A second
intifada after the failure of the 2000 Camp David negotiations to establish state-
hood saw the rise of the Islamic group Hamas, which used bombing as a strategy
against Israel and was designated a terrorist organization by the United States and
EU. Hamas won elections in Gaza in 2006, which led to the United States, EU,
and Israel boycotting the Palestinian Authority, and eventually to a split rule
between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza (Koinova 2014). Violent
interactions and Israeli bombing of Gaza took place in 2008, 2012, and 2014, and
continue to different degrees until the present.
The warfare increased mobilization domestically and abroad. Palestine was
given “non-member observer state” status by the UN General Assembly in 2012,
paving the way for statehood (UN 2012). This decision remains controversial;
countries primarily in Latin America, Africa, and Asia have recognized Palestinian
statehood, while Israel, the United States, and many countries in Europe have not
(Walker 2015). Evidence from diaspora claims about statehood and refugee
return illustrates how sociospatial positionality shapes diaspora mobilization.
Palestinians operate in a large transnational social field, where ties connect
individuals in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem with those displaced in the
Middle East, most notably the camps in Lebanon; Jordan, Syria, and the Gulf
states; and the larger diaspora, primarily the Americas and Europe. Shiblak
(2005) notes that the United States and Latin America were migration destina-
tions even before 1948. Migration to Europe is more recent, starting in the 1960s,
increasing after clashes between Palestinians and Arab governments in the 1970s,
and especially driven by the Lebanon civil war to Britain, Germany, and the
Scandinavian countries. Increasing numbers sought asylum in Canada and
Australia in the 1990s (Shiblak 2005, 10–11). There is a wave stemming from the
Israeli bombings of Gaza and the civil war in Syria (2011–present).
The positionality of Palestinian diaspora political agents is relative. Some have
thicker linkages to certain sociospatial contexts than to others. There is deep mar-
ginalization of refugees in Lebanon, relatively successful integration in the
United States, and integration alongside isolation in Europe (Shulz 2005, 20).
Linkages to original homelands shape potential diaspora political involvement.
Refugees in Germany, for example, have thick linkages to Lebanon, where
around 80 percent of the Palestinian population in Germany originate (Shiblak
2005, 13). Thus, activities in Germany were for a long time shaped in Lebanese
circles (Ghadban 2005, 40). Thick linkages to Lebanon also exist in Sweden and
other Scandinavian countries (Shiblak 2005), which accepted refugees from the
1991 Kuwait War (Abulghani 2005) and recurrent Gaza warfare. In contrast, the
Palestinian diaspora in the United Kingdom is linked to Lebanon, the West Bank,
and Gaza. There are also numerous links to the Gulf states from the United
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Kingdom and France. As Hanafi notes: “Connections between the Palestinian
periphery in Europe and the centre in the Palestinian Territories are clearly
loose. North American communities, despite their more distant location, are gen-
erally better connected” (2005, 145).
The multiple contexts in which the diaspora is embedded, and the perpetuated
condition of statelessness complicated by restrictive host-state citizenship regimes
or chosen voluntarily by Palestinians to preserve the right to return, facilitate dia-
spora mobilization through transnational channels and network-based activism, not
least because large groups of undocumented migrants and shadow workers also
span borders. Their transnational linkages are person-to-person rather than institu-
tionally bound to certain contexts. Even if relatively well integrated in some host
countries, the positionality of Palestinian diaspora political agents vis-a-vis these
countries can be perceived as relatively weak, as demonstrated by the UK context.
Palestinians in the United Kingdom—like Armenians—live in the same country
and abide by the same laws, and many are well integrated (Nabulsi 2006). But
their diaspora political agents perceive themselves as relatively weak to pursue
claims through UK-based institutions for the following reasons. As I argue else-
where (Koinova 2014), first is their relatively low identification with the United
Kingdom: “Arabs in general behave as permanent residents in the UK, enjoy the
benefits of democracy and the rule of law, but see themselves as part of the larger
Arab world and are completely focused on events in Palestine” (R7 2010).6 Even if
exaggerated, this statement is indicative of certain attitudes. Second, Britain is
considered the state where the Palestinian problem originated, as it permitted the
formation of Israel. The historical context is not supportive of Palestinian claims
for statehood. Activists argue that Britain needs to apologize (Nabulsi 2006, 212,
24–42; Safieh 2010, 116). Third, diaspora political agents consider that an active
Israeli lobby opposes strong involvement in UK politics, building on historical
links between the labor movement and Israel.
Even if considering their positionality relatively weak, Palestinian diaspora politi-
cal agents point out that the UK context puts them in a position of power to organ-
ize through local and transnational activist networks. Liberal legislation, sharp class
differences, numerous Islamic networks, and a relatively respectful attitude by the
police are considered conducive to pursuing victim-based claims. London especially
has been an important hub for mobilization (Adamson and Koinova 2013). It is
considered the “media capital of the Arab world,” with numerous Arabic-language
TV channels (R7, R8 2010)7 and close to one hundred Palestinian journalists
(Safieh 2010, 273). According to a government-based employee, Palestinians are
more likely to engage through protest than through lobbying, since media atten-
tion in London can multiply their messages (R9 2009).8
Palestinian diaspora political agents in the United Kindom developed numer-
ous activities with local and transnational activist networks. Medical Aid for
Palestine (MAP) engaged with humanitarian emergencies and long-term health
issues in the West Bank, Gaza, and the camps in Lebanon (MAP 2010). Some
charities have been publicly questioned about suspected links to radical groups,
including the Palestinian Relief and Development Fund (Interpal) (Young 2010)
and Viva Palestina (Ainsworth 2013). The Palestinian Return Centre has advo-
cated for the right of return and commemoration of Nakbah, quite often through
Islamic networks, including a growing Palestinians in Europe conference; Islamic
Relief and Islamic Help, among other Islamic charities, has also been active.
Diaspora political agents have also been involved with leftist networks. Stop the
6 R7. 2010. Palestinian diaspora activist, author’s interview, 7 May, London.
7 R7. 2010. Palestinian diaspora activist, author’s interview, 7 May, London; and R8. 2010. Palestinian writer and
activist, author’s interview, 7 May, London.
8 R9. 2009. Palestinian diaspora activist close to PSC, author’s interview, 20 August, London.
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War Coalition (Slawson and Davidson 2014); Palestinian Solidarity Campaign
(2015), and others actively lobby the UK government, but their strength has been
in mobilizing activist networks locally and internationally, including through the
boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) campaign. Pressure “from below” has
affected public opinion, shifting toward more sympathy for Palestinian rights,
especially after the 2014 Gaza warfare (Watt 2014). Such shifts have been condu-
cive to changes in high politics; in 2014 the United Kingdom was the second
country in Europe after Sweden to formally recommend Palestinian statehood
(BBC 2014).
Empowerment through context and potentialities to use power to achieve politi-
cal goals are quite visible when comparing the UK and US Palestinian diasporas.
Even though the US diaspora is larger, with estimates between 85,186 (ACS 2013)
and 200,000 (Kurson 2015), than that in the UK, between 20,000 (Shiblak 2005,
13) and 40,000 (Nabulsi 2006, 258), US diaspora political agents do not face the
same favorable sociospatial context. Migrant integration on an individual basis,
rather than increasingly problematic multiculturalism as in the United Kingdom,
did not produce large-scale discontent in large Islamic networks to easily integrate
Palestinian grievance-based claims. Islamic appeal in the United States has been
somewhat limited, not least because many earlier generations of Palestinians were
Christian, and as Gertheiss argues, because securitization measures after the terro-
rist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 suppressed overt activism (2016, 134). Leftist organiza-
tions and trade unions have also been historically weak. Potentialities for lobbying
have been blocked by a powerful Israeli lobby, despite efforts by the Arab
American Institute, American Task Force on Palestine, and Jerusalem Fund/
Palestine Center to build awareness in Washington (AAI 2015; ATFP 2015;
Jerusalem Fund 2015). A powerful mobilizer, the US Campaign to End the Israeli
Occupation, has sought political change through activist networks. This coalition
of more than one hundred civic organizations, with a wide spectrum of political
commitments to peace and justice for Palestinians and more broadly in the
Middle East, includes interfaith, Christian, and Jewish organizations. Many of
these have espoused the BDS campaign (End of Occupation 2015), which has
“gained considerable ground among American Jews, primarily on college
campuses” (Barghouti 2011). Especially after the 2014 war, the campaign has rap-
idly grown in both the United States and Europe.
Disempowerment through context is quite visible in Germany, with the largest
population of Palestinians estimated at 80,000 (Ghadban 2005, 32). Lobbying and
activism have been minimal compared to the United Kingdom and United States.
Migrant integration is more challenging due to restrictive citizenship and asylum
laws and limited rights during periods of delayed deportation (Ghadban 2005,
27–35). For diaspora political agents an even more important impediment has
been Germany’s history with the Holocaust and staunch support for Israel as a
reaction. Activities challenging Israel have not easily taken root among policy
makers or civil society (R10, R11 2015).9
The UK role as a crucial hub for Palestinian activism in Europe is widely
acknowledged among diaspora political agents from other European countries.
In Germany, they look to UK activities and seek to facilitate diffusion of knowl-
edge, especially with regard to the BDS campaign (R10, R12 2015).10 Palestinian
organizations in the Netherlands campaigned for divestment of a major pension
fund from Israeli banks in 2014 (R13 2015; Visser 2014).11 They have also kept
9 R10. 2015. Palestinian academic, author’s interview, 22 April, Berlin, Germany; and R11. 2015. German politi-
cian, author’s interview, 23 April, Berlin, Germany.
10 R10. 2015. Palestinian academic, author’s interview, 22 April, Berlin, Germany; and R12. Palestinian activist,
author’s interview, 7 April, Berlin, Germany.
11 R13. 2015. Palestinian academic activist, discussion with the author, 17 October. London.
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close contacts with UK-based civic organizations and academic networks
(R13 2015).12 Even in Sweden, frontrunner of Palestinian statehood recognition
in Europe, some activists sought to participate regularly in the annual conference
of the Palestinians in Europe, organized by the Palestinian Return Centre
(R14 2015).13
Fluidity of diaspora positionality is demonstrated by the changing context for
PLO mobilization. Egypt played an important role in its establishment in 1964
after President Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to convene an organization to repre-
sent the Palestinians during an Arab League summit. The PLO was strongly influ-
enced by Egypt during the early years (Robinson 2009). Palestinians (as well as
PLO activists) in Egypt and Gaza enjoyed basic rights, such as public sector
employment and property rights (El-Abed 2011). As Mattar argues, Yasser Arafat,
Fatah and PLO leader (1969–2004), was a student activist in Cairo, but sought
independence from Egypt, where his ideas about national liberation through
armed struggle were not likely to take root. Seeking a context conducive to guer-
rilla operations, he briefly explored conditions in Syria and the West Bank, but
eventually settled in Jordan, where refugee camps became his main source of
recruits (2005, 59–61). Recurrent violence between Palestinian fighters and secur-
ity forces culminated in the Jordanian civil war (1970–1971) and PLO expulsion
(Robinson 2009). The organization reestablished operations in Lebanon, another
conducive context because of the refugee camps. Expelled after the 1982 Israeli
invasion, the last PLO headquarters before the 1993 Oslo Accords were moved to
Tunisia, at the time headquarters of the Arab League (Palestine Facts 2015).
A final note illustrates how positionality is a perceptional category. Palestinian
diaspora political agents in the same country consider themselves differently
empowered to pursue statehood depending on individual sociospatial linkages.
For example, diaspora sympathizers with Fatah and Hamas in various countries in
Europe have networks that seldom cross except for large-scale protests against vio-
lence in Gaza, and more recently regarding some BDS activities. Diaspora political
agents can be linked to the West Bank (for Fatah) and Gaza (for Hamas), but
their perceptions of where they derive their power need not be directly linked to
these territories. Visions for future statehood based on a two-state solution (the
dominant international view) or one-state solution draw them to seek sympathetic
constituencies, in the same country or internationally. Some diaspora members in
the United Kingdom and France have ties with Gulf states and may keep busi-
nesses abroad (Hanafi 2005, 143), but sponsor political projects in their host
country or another. Perceptions are individual and subjective but can nevertheless
aggregate in line with Sen (1993)’s “positional objectivity”: diaspora political
agents could perceive themselves as more powerful to pursue claims for
Palestinian statehood in the United Kingdom than in Germany.
Conclusions
The concept of sociospatial diaspora positionality can be a major means to open
statist paradigms and contribute to a growing understanding that a simple trian-
gular relationship between diasporas, host states, and home states cannot
adequately explain diaspora mobilization trajectories. This article has sought to
shift attention toward a cluster of midrange sociopositional theories that have
gained strength in IR since the mid-2000s. Diaspora sociospatial positionality
accounts for the embedded agency of diasporas in multiple sociospatial contexts
that span a transnational social field and the global locations in which diasporas
live. The merits of positional analysis and major aspects of diaspora positionality
12 R13. 2015. Palestinian academic activist, discussion with the author, 17 October. London.
13 R14. Palestinian academic activist, author’s interview, 9 September, Malmo, Sweden.
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as a concept—relativity, power, fluidity, and perception—can be shown in juxta-
position to other closely related spatial concepts: distance/proximity and social
network. The unique characteristics of a particular context (the conglomeration
of institutions, networks, resources, historical legacies, regime, political culture,
and position in the international system, among others) and sustained linkages
with that context through frequent communication, societal integration, travel
between locales, circular migration, joint participation and planning of events,
and other common activities shape—if not necessarily determine—diaspora politi-
cal agents’ behavior. Positionality also has implications for the trajectories of dia-
spora mobilization. Diaspora political agents who perceive their positionality as
relatively strong in a sociopolitical context are more likely to engage in institu-
tional politics from above, through contained contention and moderate politics.
If they perceive their positionality as relatively weak, they are more likely to
engage with local or transnational activist networks, politics from below, and use
contained but also transgressive contention.
The conceptual discussion is illustrated with empirical evidence from patterns
of mobilization of two conflict-generated diasporas—Armenian and Palestinian—
for genocide recognition and statehood, respectively. Choosing conflict-
generated diasporas with linkages to multiple contexts of original homelands, de
facto states (Nagorno-Karabakh and Palestine), and territories where diaspora
brethren live show that analyzing triangular relationships alone is not adequate; a
positional analysis is necessary to factor in contexts and linkages. Diaspora politi-
cal agents are not evenly embedded in the different global contexts and have
more links to certain contexts than to others, even if physically present in all of
them. The Armenian diaspora in Germany is more numerous than in the United
Kingdom, but diaspora political agents experience their positionality as relatively
weak. They considered themselves impeded by the unresolved historical legacy of
Germany’s role in the Armenian genocide before its recent recognition in 2016
and by strong public claims against genocide recognition by powerful Turkish
groups. These political agents have been in a much stronger position in the
United States, where well-integrated diaspora activists have built a powerful lobby,
little impeded by other counter-claims or historical legacies, but empowered by
their embeddedness in a state that is a global power. Palestinian diaspora activists
too have experienced weak positionality in Germany, and stronger in Sweden or
the United Kingdom, where they have been better integrated and have developed
stronger institutional linkages.
The systemic effects of sustained ties among diasporas in a transnational social
field also become visible as diaspora political agents in peripheral contexts seek
collaborations with those embedded in hubs. Armenian diaspora activists in
Germany and the Netherlands identified the United States and France as impor-
tant hubs for Armenian mobilization. Palestinian diaspora agents in Germany, the
Netherlands, and Sweden identified the United Kingdom as an important hub for
Palestinian mobilization.
Diaspora positionality becomes quite visible when conflict-generated diasporas
and weak states are concerned, not least because the latter have few resources and
they can creatively use the positional power of diaspora political agents in differ-
ent contexts to enhance the likelihood for success of homeland-oriented goals.
Such contextual empowerment has been observed in the mobilization of other
conflict-generated diasporas. In the aftermath of Kosovo’s 2008 independence,
Kosovar political agents have considered the United States a less conducive con-
text for global advocacy for state independence, but more conducive for financial
investment. With its business entrepreneurial culture, the United States has
attracted diasporas that have accumulated wealth in a relatively short period of
time since the end of the Cold War (Koinova 2016). Bosnian diaspora political
agents have benefited from the Dutch political context to make transnational
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activist claims. Not on the radar screen of scholars and policy makers, the Dutch
context became a hub for contentious politics because of unresolved issues
related to the questionable implications of Dutch peace-keeping forces in the
1995 Srebrenica genocide. The Dutch hub has empowered diaspora political
agents to make transnational activist claims not only regarding Srebrenica, but
also concerning other war atrocities. By contrast, Bosnian diaspora embeddedness
in the United Kingdom has been less conducive to transnational activism
(Koinova and Karabegovic 2016).
Additional research is needed among diasporas that originate in voluntary
migration, or are conflict-generated but connected to strong states. It is likely that
diaspora positionality will remain analytically important when diasporas are in sus-
tained interactions with their original home states and other diasporas, as their
behaviors will be shaped by such ties. To this end, this theoretical framework will
be also important to apply when analyzing diasporas who seek to enhance eco-
nomic development and knowledge transfer to their countries of origin.
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